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In Enlightened Sentiments, Hina 
Nazar shows how Enlightenment 
rationalism is involved with sen-
timentalism, and how that involve-
ment is embedded within Romantic 
fiction. Sentimentalism, located 
philosophically with David Hume 
and Adam Smith and  fictively with 
novelists as differently positioned 
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jane 
Austen, is “mutually engaged” 
with rationalism “in an ongoing 
liberal project that seeks norma-
tive underpinnings for a postmeta-
physical age” (3). Nazar grounds 
her argument in a delineation of an 
autonomous judgment that is fun-
damentally social, enacted through 
the epistolarity of mid-century nov-
els and within the drawing rooms 
of Austen’s domestic fiction. The 
“social constitution of subjectiv-
ity” (4) aligns sentimentalism with 
Kantian rationalism through their 
shared use of an “aesthetic analogy 
for moral judgment” (5): characters 
in novels judge others and their 
own hearts by using the same rules 
and standards by which they judge 
landscapes, artworks, poems.
Nazar establishes the frame-
work for her argument in the first 
two chapters, which outline the 
“rhetoric of spectatorship” (12) that 
informs philosophical and novelis-
tic sentimentalism. Spectatorship 
links aesthetic and moral judgment 
to “an understanding of individu-
als as socially embedded subjects, 
whose ability to question the norms 
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articulates inward judgment but 
upends its infallibility. Through 
Clarissa’s insistence that self- 
examination is a social act, fully real-
ized only in exchange, Richardson 
“opens up an ethical understand-
ing that pivots around standpoints 
rather than standards, and that 
identifies the social world to be 
an ineluctably perspectival public 
space” (79).
In “A Sentimental Education: 
Rousseau to Godwin,” Nazar reads 
Rousseau’s Julie, ou la nouvelle 
Héloise (Julie, or the New Heloise, 
1761), as one of Clarissa’s immedi-
ate heirs. Inheritance is a key criti-
cal trope in Enlightened Sentiments: 
the legacy of “moral self- direction” 
(1) passes from Clarissa to Julie 
to Henry Mackenzie’s Julia de 
Roubigné (1777) to William 
Godwin’s Fleetwood (1805) to “the 
writings of one of sentimentalism’s 
most important literary heirs”: 
Austen (115). But, like the plots of 
so many sentimental novels, literary 
heritability is never straightforward: 
every generation, as Mary Crawford 
remarks in Mansfield Park (1814), 
“has its improvements.” In Julie, 
“Rousseau seeks to revise Clarissa 
into a Bildungsroman of the pas-
sions, to show how the love of two 
people of refined  sensibilities  .  .  . 
lends itself to affiliation with  virtue” 
(82). But by the novel’s conclusion, 
which leaves St. Preux as an intel-
lectually free ascetic and Julie as 
both bourgeois matron and will-
ing sacrifice, it has become “simply 
of their societies and to constitute 
alternative principles of action 
requires active social engagement 
in the form of critical debate” (16). 
The “claims of the subject” in sen-
timentalism and Kantian aesthetics 
share space with the claims “of con-
text” (58). In chapter 3, “Judging 
Clarissa’s Heart,” Nazar points 
out that Samuel Richardson’s epis-
tolary structure cooperates with 
Clarissa’s (1748) trope of spectator-
ship to enforce the sociability of 
judgment. Throughout the novel, 
until her death and martyrdom, 
Clarissa “insistently questions her 
heart’s authority” (61), install-
ing herself as both spectator and 
judge. Her understanding of her-
self “as her heart’s observer rather 
than its blind disciple” emerges in 
her injunctions to her friend and 
correspondent Anna to “‘lay [her] 
heart open,’ as though it were a 
book that could be placed on a lec-
tern, or some other object for joint 
 viewing” (64).
In its formal structure as much 
as its plotting, Richardson’s novel 
insists on an “other-directedness 
of judgment” (52) that derives 
from David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant. Through her letters, Clarissa 
“socialize[s]” the “paradigm of 
judgment” (62). Correspondence 
enables her to receive “readers’ 
reports on her self- representation” 
(67)—a departure from the Puritan 
diarists whose rigorous self-scrutiny 
constitutes them as her most obvi-
ous formal forebears. Epistolarity 
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from family memoirs attesting 
to her Richardsonian taste and 
knowledge head the chapter) to 
offer this novel as a kind of read-
out of all the elements that link 
Richardson equally with Humean 
sentiment and Kantian aesthet-
ics. Austen’s first published novel, 
and one that was begun in the last 
decade of the eighteenth century, 
Sense and Sensibility (1811) fol-
lows in the line of descent from 
Richardson through Mackenzie 
and Godwin. It also looks, as many 
readers have noted, like an explicit 
critique of sentimentalism, and 
Nazar devotes some time to the 
antisentimentalist take on Austen, 
most often lodged in her two ear-
liest written novels, surveying 
critics from Walter Scott and Ian 
Watt to Marilyn Butler and Clara 
Tuite. Rather than focusing on the 
instability of Austen’s oppositions, 
however, the “broadly history-of-
ideas” context for Nazar’s reading 
offers the tension between the two 
Dashwood sisters rather as a “fam-
ily quarrel within sentimentalism” 
(9). Both, she argues, “take judg-
ment and feeling to be inextricably 
intertwined” (121). The difference 
lies in one sister’s commitment to 
judging within rather than against 
the social world. In the end, for 
Nazar, Austen’s novel highlights 
the difficulties of judging “in a 
world in which established rules 
have lost authority” (123). This is 
the world of Clarissa, but it’s also 
the world of all Austen novels, in 
a narrative of replacing obedience 
with  obedience” (91).
Mackenzie and Godwin set 
out to correct the patriarchalism 
that erases Julie from Rousseau’s 
narrative—one with tragic over-
lay, one with liberal corrective. In 
Julia, Mackenzie returns to the 
female community that consti-
tuted the sociability of judgment 
for Richardson, but establishes its 
fragility through a weakened epis-
tolary frame, “attenuated” toward 
century’s end “by the growing 
internal differentiation of modern 
society” (100–101), and in the face 
of the commodification implicit in 
an Othello-like plot of “imagined 
infidelity and jealous rage” (98). In 
Fleetwood, Godwin offers “the mon-
strous progeny of a Rousseauvian 
education” (106). Fleetwood’s sen-
sibility lacks “ perspective-making 
contact with a broad spectrum of 
other standpoints” (109), and his 
unchecked egoism militates against 
the companionate union that is the 
dream of sentimental fiction. The 
second chance afforded him at the 
novel’s conclusion places Fleetwood 
“at a critical juncture between senti-
mental tragedy and the comic reso-
lutions of many nineteenth-century 
realist novels” (115), bridging the 
generation gap between Rousseau 
and Austen.
In “Judgment, Propriety,  and 
the Critique of Sensibility: The 
‘Sentimental’ Jane Austen,” Nazar 
reworks the official story of Austen’s 
reverence for Richardson (quotes 
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era and continent, is a gendered 
space. Highlighting “the domestic 
woman’s fitness for critical think-
ing and public participation” (144), 
it “is the place where middle-class 
women like Austen’s heroines and 
Jane Austen herself stepped into a 
larger world” (146).
Nazar’s readings of these novels, 
and of the complex philosophical 
history that informs them, are uni-
formly rigorous, thoughtful, and 
illuminating. Her conclusion—that 
“by casting her light on the drawing 
room, Austen places the norm of a 
common point of view at the center 
of a nineteenth-century tradition of 
fiction that builds on eighteenth-
century sentimentalism and aes-
thetics” (146)—makes Enlightened 
Sentiments not just an engaged work 
of literary criticism but an impor-
tant interlocutor for other scholars 
of emergent domestic realism.
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which heroines cannot depend on 
traditional hierarchical structures. 
The Dashwoods employ aesthetic 
criteria as a means of judging char-
acter. (Nazar points out that both 
sisters value connoisseurship in a 
potential lover.) But Elinor’s “cul-
tivated impartiality” contrasts with 
Marianne’s Fleetwood-like nar-
cissism and isolationism in being 
“highly compatible with the norms 
of politeness” (136).
Throughout this chapter, Nazar 
signals a canny recognition of 
Austen’s status as a novelist so 
beloved she becomes a malleable 
character all her own. In a neat 
reworking of yet another favorite 
biographical detail, she connects 
Elinor’s ability to muse over her 
own faithless lover without shutting 
herself up in her room to Austen’s 
reputed habit of writing her fic-
tion in the family drawing room. 
Both indicate “a liberty of mind or 
thought that is operative even in the 
presence of others” (142). Austen’s 
drawing-room settings, in other 
words—both within her novels and 
in the stories of their production— 
emphasize not the impossibility but 
the sociability of reverie. Moreover, 
she recognizes that the drawing 
room, like the salon of a different 
